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Main article

Knowing one's place: The distribution of new accounting academics into a segmented labor market

Timothy J. Fogarty^{a,*}, Donald V. Saftner^{b,1}, James R. Hasselback^{c,2}

^aCase Western Reserve University, Department of Accountancy, Weatherhead School of Management, Cleveland, OH 44106, United States

^bUniversity of Toledo, Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, Toledo, OH 43606-3390, United States

^cUniversity of West Florida, Department of Accounting & Finance, College of Business, Pensacola, FL 32514, United States

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ABSTRACT

New academic accountants tend to believe that there is a singular academic labor market that will receive them as they approach the completion of their doctoral programs. In such a world, the caliber of their ideas would be judged according to their ability to make a contribution to the knowledge of discipline. However, past research suggests that a prestige structure exists for doctoral programs such that a candidate's ability to be placed at a school is a function of his/her doctoral programs position in that hierarchy. In this world, limits exist upon possible placement for most candidates such that the caliber of their work will not be a determinative factor in their placement. Various divisions of the doctoral schools in accounting show that movement to higher groups is difficult for all groups. The higher-tier schools are more able to place their graduates in the same tier. Falls to lower tiers are especially likely for the graduates of the lower prestige groups of doctoral schools. This paper seeks to help participants in the labor market, doctoral candidates and those that hire them, obtain a more informed appreciation for their realistic prospects. In this way, an achievable expectation should lead to more efficient placement behavior.

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* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 216 368 3938; fax: +1 216 368 6244.

E-mail addresses: tjf@case.edu (T.J. Fogarty), donald.saftner@utoledo.edu (D.V. Saftner), jhasselback@uwf.edu (J.R. Hasselback).

¹ Tel.: +1 419 530 2327.

² Tel.: +1 850 473 7100.

1. The distribution of new accounting academics: one labor market or several?

One of the greatest mysteries in academic accounting pertains to the job market for terminally qualified candidates for faculty positions. Who gets offers at what school seems to be related to a large variety of factors, only some of which relate to the attributes of the specific candidates. Understanding market structure is important so that unrealistic expectations do not lead to inefficient behavior and diminished enthusiasm to join the community. How the labor market works is also important to all of those involved in the process of recruiting new faculty and helping place them in suitable academic appointments.

At first glance, progress in this area would seem to depend upon the views of market participants and therefore would seem to call for the solicitation of their opinions. In fact, this type of work has a legacy and continues to be done (Ostrowski, 1986; Hunt, Eaton, & Reinstein, 2009). However, such methods are incapable of exposing the nature of opportunities that are presented. How individuals pick among their choices does not reveal why such alternatives exist, and why others have a different set from which they select. A turn toward the archival record of successful placements is needed if the patterns of possibility are to be revealed.

The limited work that has been done on the labor market for academic accountants suggests that some divisions among doctoral schools might provide incremental understanding. However, all of this work relates to placements made long ago, and therefore might not be descriptive of current realities. Much has transpired in the accounting discipline in the last two decades. For example, doctoral student production has not been able to keep pace with the rates observed during the 1980s. Demand for the available candidates, although subject to some down years, has remained strong. As a result of these trends, starting compensation packages have escalated considerably. New doctoral programs have started and some established ones have become inactive. All these reasons, as well as others, suggest that a description of placement possibilities may have changed in material ways.

This paper proposes that the placement of a doctoral student is indicative of a structured relationship of institutional prestige. If it is generally true that schools recruit assistant professors from schools that they respect and admire, a status hierarchy can be said to exist that describes the possibilities of placement. Using the entire population of placements from 1970 to 2009, this research groups doctoral programs into tiers that make the existence of multiple placement markets manifest. The analysis indicates that the tiers that are created make visible the placement patterns that suggest varying institutional ability to preserve graduates in their tier, or to result in the lower-level placement of graduates.

The remainder of this paper is organized into four subsequent sections. The first section reviews the most relevant literature. This effort is not done for the purpose of stating hypotheses but instead to illustrate the consistency of this paper's description of the labor market with previous studies. A second section describes the methodology. The third section contains the results. The final section discusses the findings, identifies limitations, and provides ideas for future research.

2. A limited literature review

When McGee (1971) asserted that it was impossible to underestimate the importance of institutional prestige as a force in the academy, no study of this element had been performed for academic accounting. Although much has changed in this discipline since that time, the proposition that all schools are not equal has become more recognized in its many permutations. The placement of doctoral students represents perhaps the clearest opportunity to view the operation of this social variable.

Early studies of personnel movements began to recognize the existence of a select group of schools. Nikolai and Bazley (1977) and Bazley and Nikolai (1975) nominate a set of 20 schools that appeared to swap personnel. These studies were limited by the *ad hoc* nature of the identification of the group of schools, and by the fact that personnel exchanges were only considered in the binary fashion that distinguished the in-group and out-group movements of new faculty.

Fogarty and Saftner (1993) extended the placement analysis to all doctoral programs in the accounting discipline by reasoning that the elite-versus-others view was an unnecessarily primitive conception. Clearly, non-elites did not perceive themselves to be in an undifferentiated second class. More likely, non-elite schools understood their prestige to be better than some schools and not as

good as others, notwithstanding their simultaneous recognition of an elite. Therefore, the identification of a fully articulated hierarchy of programs presented an important empirical challenge.

Arguing that the perception of social esteem can best be measured when constituent entities engage in exchange transactions, Fogarty and Saftner (1993) posit that the hiring of a doctoral student represents an implicit acknowledgment that the candidate's doctoral program is a quality one, at least from the perspective of that hiring school. High-prestige programs are such, in part, because they can attract the attention of faculty candidates from many schools (including those that are themselves highly respected) and can afford to disregard those from those schools that are not well-regarded. Low-prestige schools, by definition, will not have such a broad candidate pool for their faculty openings, and therefore cannot afford to be so restrictive in their screening decisions. Although exceptions certainly exist where candidates possess personal attributes that make them either better than or not as good as their doctoral program's position in the eyes of constituents, the market tends to be mostly efficient as it is enacted by decision-makers. Caplow and McGee (1958) point out that faculty, engaged in the recruiting effort, tend not to look very far beyond the prestige of the candidate's school. If this is true, the exceptions will be few, and those that do exist will not influence the aggregate results in any systematic or meaningful way.

Although a fully articulated prestige hierarchy among the schools that offer the doctorate degree in accounting may seem like an important accomplishment, it might suffer from illusionary precision. The number of placements might not be adequate to support the thin distinctions that any ordinal ranking would have one believe. A less demanding ordering of the schools would involve organizing them into empirically justified sets for the purpose of describing their placement abilities.

3. Method and measures

In this paper, we defined institutional prestige in terms of a school's job market placement ability. Unlike other studies that focus upon faculty publication productivity, citation counts of scholarly influence or survey summaries of reputation, we assert that all such measures are subsumed into the willingness of other schools to react favorably to a school's doctoral graduates. Placement results were then organized into hierarchical set of groups, where institutional placement into these groups was a function of achieving quality placements, both in a global sense of staying within the doctoral producing sector, and in a more specific sense of doing better than other similarly situated doctoral student producers. This study utilizes the two measures devised by Fogarty and Saftner (1993). These measures collectively allow a hierarchy of placement power to be constructed. This hierarchy allows a meaningful description of placement activity to be organized. Because these measures are important, they need to be described in some detail.

Fogarty and Saftner (1993) use two separate measures that are reported separately and then combined for overall ranking purposes. The first is intuitively obvious and needs little explanation. Doctoral programs are ranked by their ability to place a percentage of their graduates in the doctoral school sector. *Ceteris paribus*, the superior research environment provided by the schools in the doctoral sector is differentially valued by the other programs that produce doctoral students. While exceptions exist, the social differentiation between doctoral and non-doctoral programs is well established in the literature (Ruscio, 1987).

The second measure is more complex, since it erodes the homogeneity of doctoral sector placements. Fogarty and Saftner (1993) describe it also follows:

This measure, which can be called *distance*, can be conceptualized as a sequence of steps. For example, if all of a school's graduates go to non-doctoral schools, that school is one step removed from the non-doctoral schools. If all of a school's graduates go to doctoral schools that are one step removed from the non-doctoral schools, then that school is two steps removed from the non-doctoral schools. A third ideal type of doctoral program might place all its students with schools two steps removed from the non-doctoral schools. Since all of a school's graduates do not go to one type of school, the computed distance to non-doctoral schools is a mathematical function of the distribution of these types of placements. Specifically, "distance" is defined to be one plus the average distance to non-doctoral schools of the schools where graduates are placed. The logic of downward movement

suggests that the greater the distance from non-doctoral schools, the higher the assumed prestige of the doctoral-granting institution.

The inclusion rules for both [Fogarty and Saftner \(1993\)](#) and the current study are:

1. The degree must be at the doctoral level (i.e., Ph.D. or D.B.A.).
2. The degree must have an accounting concentration.
3. Both the school granting the degree and the school employing the individual must be in the United States.
4. The employment must have occurred within a 3-year time horizon surrounding the graduation date.³
5. A school must have produced at least five graduates.

Our study expands upon [Fogarty and Saftner \(1993\)](#) by using doctoral student placements that occurred from 1970 to 2009 (the last year for which reasonably full data was available). A longer period has distinct advantages beyond avoiding the influence of a fewer number of individual cases. The need for at least five graduates, now sought over a longer period, leads to more program inclusion. In addition, the emergence of several new doctoral programs after 1990 has expanded the scope of doctoral programs considered.

The annual editions of the *Accounting Faculty Directory* ([Hasselback, 1990–2012](#)) allowed information concerning doctoral schools, placement schools, and year of placement to be assembled. *Hasselback* sources therefore constituted all the data needed for the empirical work of this paper.

4. Results

[Table 1](#) describes placement according to two different ways of organizing multiple markets.⁴ This differentiation starts in Panel A with the least articulated version of a differentiation of doctoral students. Specifically, a median split of the schools with high and low prestige was performed. Panel B creates a finer division of the prestige scale created by the confluence of the two measures discussed above. Schools that comprise these slices of the market are listed alphabetically in [Appendix A](#).

The panels of [Table 1](#) are organized to meaningfully disaggregate placements. Placements by the schools within the tiers are categorized as “within the tiers” (the expected result), “above the tier” (except for the top tiers), and “below the tier.” For these purposes, placements into non-doctoral schools are considered to be into a tier lower than all doctoral tiers. To the extent that placements are contained within each tier, evidence exists as to the existence of multiple markets. Alternatively, if placements are randomly distributed across tiers, less credence would exist for anything but a singular labor market.

Panel A of [Table 1](#) suggests that accounting doctoral school prestige is binary, and that a boundary could be said to exist between high- and low-prestige doctoral schools. The expectation of this model of the academic labor market would be the differential ability of high-prestige programs to avoid placements below the upper tier, and the inability of low-prestige programs to make placements into the higher set of schools. The low-prestige schools should also be less able to avoid placements into the even lower strata, here defined as all non-doctoral programs.

³ A modest improvement in methodology was also made. If a person is at school X the year before graduation (perhaps as an ABD placement), at school Y in the year of graduation (perhaps as another ABD placement), and at school Z in the year after graduation, then deciding which school placement was the “real” graduation placement is somewhat problematic given the *Hasselback Directory* data available in this study. Instead of arbitrarily picking one of the schools in the example above, each of the school placements X, Y, and Z was given one third credit. In another example if the graduate was not in the directory the year before graduation, but at school Y the year of the graduation (perhaps as an ABD placement) and at school Z in the year after the graduation, then both schools Y and Z were given one-half credit. Of course, if the graduate was at only one school (for 1, 2, or 3 years) of the 3-year time horizon, then that school was given full credit. Since this refinement applied to only a small number of candidates, its empirical impact was small.

⁴ [Table 1](#) aggregates data from 1970 to 2009 for all doctoral programs. This creates the most comprehensive view on placement. For example, if a school had more than five graduates over these 40 years, it would be included. Fewer schools are included in [Table 3](#), which considers only 10 years of placements.

Table 1

Placement results (1970–2009) by market tiers (using equal numbers of schools).

Group	Total in-group placements (%)	Total above-group placements (%)	Total below-group placements (%)
<i>Panel A</i>			
Top half (44 schools)	43.6		56.4
Bottom half (43 schools)	17.7	5.1	77.2
<i>Panel B</i>			
Top third (29 schools)	43.0		57.0
Middle third (29 schools)	18.1	7.3	74.6
Bottom third (29 schools)	9.4	6.2	84.4

The results show that 43.6% of all placements from the top half are contained within the upper tier, with the other 56.4% being made to lower regions. The latter includes placement to lower-prestige doctoral programs and the entire non-doctoral sector. These results should be contrasted with the low prestige schools for which only 5.1% were placed in the upper half of doctoral programs. Perhaps more tellingly, this sector sent 27.2% to the non-doctoral schools, retaining only 17.2% in the lower prestige half of the doctoral sector.

Panel B draws the boundaries a little more precisely, declaring three markets to exist. Using the extension of the logic in place for Panel A, the results indicate each tier dominating the placements within its tier. This result is disproportionately true in the top third with percentages retained in the tiers at 43.0%, 18.1%, and 9.4% for the first, second, and third groups, respectively. The second and third tiers again demonstrate an inability to send candidates to higher segments. For example, the bottom third of schools sent only 6.2% of their graduates to the top and middle thirds, combined. An increasing tendency to place students in the lower tiers is noted as one proceeds from top to bottom tiers. Of particular note is that even the middle third tier approaches this result for three quarters of its graduates.

A progressive articulation of tiers was conducted. Mathematically, this procedure necessarily reduces the chances that schools would place many candidates within their own tiers. Accordingly, more emphasis should be placed on the directionality of candidate movement. Throughout these divisions, the predominance of downward moves was apparent. Specifically, as one proceeds from top to bottom in any array, fewer placements above one's tier occur and more placements below one's tier happen. The tendency for the lowest tier of doctoral programs to send their graduates to the non-doctoral schools is especially pronounced, reaching nine out of ten when the doctoral schools are divided into five parts. This ability of the top stratum to "take care of their own" is undiminished even when their ranks are sliced into smaller and smaller numbers.

In sum, the above analysis suggests that the prestige of doctoral programs (as defined here) tends to constrain or set limits upon the placement of doctoral candidates. The varying placement outcomes of the different market segments strains our ability to believe that one market exists. Using divisions that evenly divided the doctoral programs into tiers, but otherwise required no judgment, showed that placement is quite predictable once the positioning of the school is known.

4.1. Sensitivity analysis

The robustness of the above conclusions was first evaluated by questioning the necessity of having an equal number of schools in each tier of the market. At the boundaries, classification error could have been caused by this design parameter. For example, the lowest-ranked program in the upper group may have greater similarity in its two measures with the next lowest group. To rectify this situation, the break points between groups were examined in a search for more mathematically defensible divisions.⁵ The impact of this procedure was to make the groups slightly unequal in number.

The result of making these adjustments was minor. The median split of Panel A proved to be the best division of two markets. The other divisions (including Panel B) required the reclassification of one or two

⁵ This adjustment involved moving the break point that would occur from equal numbers either one or two positions up or down. This was done if a larger break existed in one of these directions. Such breaks are discussed more fully in Endnote 4 and were called for by the need to improve homogeneity within groups.

Table 2
Placement results (1970–2009) by market tiers (using natural divisions* of schools).

Group	Total in-group placements (%)	Total above-group placements (%)	Total below-group placements (%)
<i>Panel A</i>			
Top group (71 schools)	44.0		56.0
Bottom group (14 schools)	5.4	3.4	91.2
<i>Panel B</i>			
Top group (51 schools)	44.3		55.7
Middle group (20 schools)	10.5	8.0	81.5
Bottom group (14 schools)	5.4	3.4	91.2

schools. The impact of these changes was quite small in terms of the substantive conclusions that results in placement difference. A small nonlinearity was noted when schools were divided into fifths. However, this departure did not compromise the general monotonic pattern of trajectories across the tiers.

In order to provide a more empirically justifiable description of the strata that exist in the market for new academic accountants, the assumption that each segment should be formed by anything close to an equal number of schools next was relaxed. For these purposes, the underlying measures that were used for the initial hierarchy construction were reviewed for the largest breaking points.⁶ This was possible since both distance and percentages were continuous and ordinal in nature. The reanalysis essentially opened up the possibility that tiers could contain a disproportionate number of schools that shared placement tendencies.

Table 2 is the result of revisiting the logic of Table 1 with the new points of division. The general tendency of this reconsideration is to increase the number of schools in the high-prestige categories, and to decrease the size of other sectors. Rather than work to identify an elite, these result suggest that the lowest prestige tier tends to be the one that is the most different in their placement results.

As expected, the new divisions serve to make the segments more internally homogeneous and more distinct from other segments. Accordingly, the summary of placement results strengthens the case for separate markets. Even in Panel A where only a binary institutional prestige difference was allowed, the ability of the 14 schools in the low-prestige group to place candidates anywhere within the 71 schools of the higher prestige group was small (3.4%). In Panel B the top group from Panel A is divided into a high prestige group of 51 and a middle prestige group of 20. The middle group has just slightly lower below-tier placement than the bottom group, but other results much larger than that bottom group.⁷

4.2. A more recent market description

Tables 1 and 2 are drawn from nearly 40 years of placements. Accordingly, the belief that “things have changed” and that the modern job market for accounting academic follows more *sui generis* rules, would be reasonable. Table 3 extracts the last 10 years of the data for individual presentation.

Placements of the “freshly minted” doctoral degree holder between 2000 and 2009 exhibit a similar pattern to the full set of data. Movement of graduates above their strata remains quite exceptional. However, movement to lower sections is very common. The same discrepancies between high-prestige and low-prestige sectors is again apparent.

Evidence also exists to suggest that the separateness of the market division has strengthened in the last decade. Upwards mobility, rather low in Tables 1 and 2, is more unusual in Table 3. In both panels, the upper division has increased the market share of upper-division placements. At the same time, no matter how the markets are divided, the lowest group is now more likely to place outside the doctoral

⁶ For these purposes, school ranks on both of the measuring metrics (distance and percentage) were combined. The natural break point was the maximum distance between occupied positions in such an array of sums. When X groups were needed, X – 1 largest breaks were chosen.

⁷ As with Table 1, the further articulation of tiers also was done for this table. No inconsistent results were produced. The text does not include other sensitivity tests that were performed. For example, schools positioned close to group boundaries were eliminated. This did not change the substantive interpretations.

school environment. When more than three tiers exist (not shown in [Table 3](#)), fewer than 1 out of 20 doctoral student graduates will be placed at another doctoral program.

5. Discussion and limitations

This paper has attempted to provide important descriptive information about the market for newly graduated accounting academics. For these purposes, we have tried to substitute a direct measure for the many indirect ones that have been offered in other ranking studies. We suggest the existence of a serious competition among doctoral programs to not only place their offerings within the general preferred sector (other doctoral programs in the discipline), but also with the specific schools that dominate the doctoral school labor market. This iterative exercise (see [Appendix B](#) for an illustration) asserts the need for the construction of a placement hierarchy of schools that is not only specific to academic accounting, but only that has been built from the actual labor market decisions of market participants over many years.

The arrays offered in [Tables 1 and 2](#) could be understood narrowly as a broad description of the academic accounting labor market in the US. To the extent that what people think of the candidates that join their schools is a reflection of what people think of the schools that trained those candidates, the array also works as a systematic way to consider institutional prestige. The former sense is intuitive since the very data used in its construction is the hiring of new faculty talent. The claim to the latter interpretation depends upon the motivations of the parties that make these placement decisions. Departments of accounting wishing to maximize the research-producing value of their membership want more people that have been trained at the schools that have proven track records of research success. Candidates want to be associated with the environments most likely to help further their careers. These are likely to be programs that are held in high esteem by the collective. Thus, placements are inevitably about the institutional status judgments of the academic community.

All the placements in the data involved candidates for positions with unique personal attributes. Some of these might make them distinctly more or less appealing as faculty members to schools. They also bring research work and interests that might have varying potential to influence the discipline and to magnify the scholarly productivity of current in-house faculty. These factors no doubt enter into decisions to extend and accept employment offers. However, unlike the institutional prestige demonstrated by this paper, individual factors tend not to be systematic and therefore are likely (at least with a large enough sample) to cancel each other out. Any predictable direction for their expression, especially as it pertains to the caliber of research, would probably parallel the social esteem dimension. Personal characteristics also are denied expression if candidates are eliminated from consideration based on the insufficient prestige of their doctoral institution.

The present research confines itself to the record created by the placement of new accounting faculty. By excluding “seasoned” hires, it does not do justice to the entirety of recruitment/placement efforts in the accounting discipline. The consideration of experienced faculty is likely to be qualitatively different in that individuals’ post-graduation accomplishments play a larger role. This factor should reduce dependence on the institutional prestige of the candidate’s credentials in offers of employment. In this way, placement may be less easy to predict and may depict more idiosyncratic and opportunistic matches. This unconsidered part of the labor market requires sustained future examination.

The attempt to specifically rank schools according to their placement results could have been conducted. Such an approach would have made too much out of the available data. The nature of institutional prestige does not lend itself to such ordinal precision. Instead, a “fuzzy set” approach has been taken. The grouping of schools align with the loose inter-subjection agreement that exists regarding the existence of a group of schools that might be considered, if not elite, then superior. Perhaps a similar consensus exists about schools not known for their work in the doctoral arena. This paper is not engaged in the process of clarifying these perceptions. However, what people think about institutions tends to be enacted through the receptivity that people bearing the imprimatur of those schools receive in employment markets.

This paper can be viewed as a study of the aspirations of labor market participants. Departments hire people they think will be productive and contributing faculty members. Candidates take positions where they think their goals will be best supported. These aspirations do not always materialize. This

Table 3
Placement results (2000–2009) by market tiers (using equal numbers of schools).

Group	Total in-group placements (%)	Total above-group placements (%)	Total below-group placements (%)
<i>Panel A</i>			
Top group (33 schools)	47.9		52.1
Bottom group (34 schools)	10.0	3.2	86.8
<i>Panel B</i>			
Top group (21 schools)	49.5		50.5
Middle group (23 schools)	18.4	5.9	75.7
Bottom group (23 schools)	3.8	2.6	93.6

paper implies that decision-makers may be too influenced by institutional status, and might be better off attempting to make more detailed investigations of the match between person and position. Since this paper was not designed specifically to explore this point, its function is to suggest such as an inquiry for future research.

This paper assumes that quality scholarship can be done by doctoral students in all sectors of the academy. If this is not true, and good work can only be done by those trained at the best schools, a different interpretation of the placement results would be appropriate. In that case, people from other schools do not get placed at the good schools because their work does not measure up to appropriate standards. The paper discounts the prospect of such an “efficient market” even if the basis for a self-fulfilling prophecy might exist. Again, more research is needed to distinguish between perception and reality.

The most practical advice that this paper offers to doctoral students resides in the documentation of the infrequency with which “up-stream” placement occurs. Put bluntly, doctoral students should not expect to achieve employment at schools well beyond the reputation of their doctoral programs. Doctoral students should attempt to evaluate the position of their program in the labor market hierarchy as a first step toward generating realistic expectations.

Appendix A. Alphabetic listings of schools by prestige tiers (using equal numbers approach)

Panel A			
<i>School</i>			
Top half		Bottom half	
	Alabama		Arkansas
	Arizona		Boston Univ.
	Arizona St		Calif.-Irvine
	Cal-Berkeley		Cen Florida
	Carnegie Mel		Cincinnati
	Case Western		Cleveland St
	Chicago		Colorado
	Columbia		Connecticut
	Cornell		CUNY-Baruch
	Duke		Drexel
	Florida		Fla. Atlantic
	Florida St		George Wash
	Georgia St		Georgia
	Harvard		Houston
	Illinois		Kent State
	Indiana		Kentucky
	Iowa		Louisiana St
	Kansas		Louisiana Tech
	Maryland		Memphis
	Massachusetts		Miss State

Appendix A (continued)

Panel A

Michigan	Mississippi
Michigan St	Missouri
Minnesota	Nebraska
MIT	North Texas
New York U	Oklahoma
No Carolina	Oklahoma St
Northwestern	Rutgers-Newark
Ohio State	Santa Clara
Oregon	So Carolina
Penn State	So Illinois
Pennsylvania	South Fla.
Pittsburgh	St Louis
Purdue	Syracuse
Rochester	Temple
So Calif.	Texas A&M
Stanford	Texas Tech
SUNY-Buffalo	Texas-Dallas
Tennessee	Tx.-Arlington
Texas-Austin	Union-NY
U Washington	Utah
UCLA	Virg. Comm.
Wash Univ.	Virg. Tech
Wisconsin	Wash State

Panel B

School

Top third	Middle third	Bottom third
Arizona	Alabama	Arkansas
Cal-Berkeley	Arizona St	Boston Univ.
Carnegie Mel	Calif.-Irvine	Cincinnati
Chicago	Case Western	Cleveland St
Columbia	Cen Florida	Connecticut
Cornell	Colorado	CUNY-Baruch
Duke	Florida St	Drexel
Florida	George Wash	Fla. Atlantic
Harvard	Georgia	Houston
Illinois	Georgia St	Kent State
Indiana	Kansas	Kentucky
Iowa	Louisiana St	Louisiana Tech
Michigan	Maryland	Memphis
Michigan St	Massachusetts	Miss State
Minnesota	Missouri	Mississippi
MIT	Oklahoma	Nebraska
New York U	Oklahoma St	North Texas
No Carolina	Oregon	Rutgers-Newark
Northwestern	Pittsburgh	Santa Clara


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Appendix A (continued)

Panel B		
Ohio State	Purdue	So Illinois
Penn State	So Calif.	South Fla.
Pennsylvania	So Carolina	St Louis
Rochester	Syracuse	Temple
Stanford	Tennessee	Texas Tech
SUNY-Buffalo	Texas A&M	Tx.-Arlington
Texas-Austin	Texas-Dallas	Union-NY
U Washington	Utah	Virg. Comm.
UCLA	Wisconsin	Virg. Tech
Wash Univ.		Wash State

Appendix B. Measurement illustration

Let us begin with the following simple⁸ scenario in which each circle represents a school and each line represents the placement of a graduate. The filled circles are doctoral-degree-granting schools and the other circles are non-doctoral-degree-granting schools. The doctoral-degree-granting schools all start off with scores of one and the non-doctoral-degree-granting schools always have scores of zero.



Sends to ->	School		
	A	B	C
	B and C	C and Nondr.	Two Nondr.
Percent Calculation	100% = Avg(1,1)	50% = Avg(1,0)	0% = Avg(0,0)
Distance Calculation			
Repetition			
0	1	1	1
1	2 = 1+Avg(1,1)	1.5 = 1+Avg(1,0)	1 = 1+Avg(0,0)
2	2.25 = 1+Avg(1.5,1)	1.5 = 1+Avg(1,0)	1 = 1+Avg(0,0)
3	2.25 = 1+Avg(1.5,1)	1.5 = 1+Avg(1,0)	1 = 1+Avg(0,0)

Percent Calculation

The Percent Score of each doctoral-granting school is calculated as the average score of the schools to which graduates are sent.

Distance Calculation

⁸ This example assumes that each graduate is sent to a single school. The line from A to C in this example means that someone graduated from school A and went to school C and stayed there for multiple years. If, instead, the person went to school C in the graduation year and then went to a non-doctoral school in the following year, then there would be two arrows (one from A to C and another from A to Nondr. with each arrow weighted at one half of the current weight.)

	School		
	A	B	C
Sends to →	B and C	C and Nondr.	Two Nondr.
Percent calculation	100% = Avg(1,1)	50% = Avg(1,0)	0% = Avg(0,0)
Distance calculation			
Repetition			
0	1	1	1
1	$2 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1,1)$	$1.5 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1,0)$	$1 = 1 + \text{Avg}(0,0)$
2	$2.25 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1.5,1)$	$1.5 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1,0)$	$1 = 1 + \text{Avg}(0,0)$
3	$2.25 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1.5,1)$	$1.5 = 1 + \text{Avg}(1,0)$	$1 = 1 + \text{Avg}(0,0)$

B.1. Percent calculation

The Percent Score of each doctoral-granting school is calculated as the average score of the schools to which graduates are sent.

B.2. Distance calculation

Each doctoral school's Distance Score is calculated as one plus the average Distance Score of the schools to which graduates are sent. The calculation is repeated until there is no material change in the Distance Score of any school.

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